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narrowing the venue, the solicitation of suits40 would be greatly reduced.
The Bill died in a Senate committee.
Another possible solution would be the creation of a workmen's com-
pensation act applicable to employees of interstate railroads.4 7 A rea-
sonable compensation for all injuries sustained, regardless of negligence,
might prove to be more desirable than a few cases of very large recov-
eries where the injury is a major one and where the railroad is clearly
negligent. However, the adoption of a federal act in this field seems
unlikely.
4 8
The evils surrounding the misuse of the venue privileges given by
the Act could be greatly diminished by each state adopting the doctrine
of forum non conveniens as part of its law, but at best this result would.
be slow and decidedly uncertain. Due to the inability of Congress or the
federal courts, as 'displayed by the Mayfield case, to make the doctrine
of forum von conveniens available as a procedural rule in the state
courts, 40 serious reconsideration should be given to the Jennings Bill
as offering the better solution to a proper administration of the federal
act. Certainly, such flaunting of legal ethics and principles of justice5°
demands immediate and well considered attention.
WILLIAM C. MORIMS, JR.
Life Insurance-Killing of Insured by Primary Beneficiary-
Recovery by Contingent Beneficiary
It has been almost universally held, based on broad grounds of pub-
lic policy, that the beneficiary of a life insurance contract who intention-
ally and wrongfully kills the insured cannot recover the policy proceeds.
This does not absolve the insurer from liability under the usual insurance
contract, but only denies the beneficiary's right to recover. Under such
circumstances the benefits may be recovered by the estate of the deceased
insured on a constructive trust theory. However, the insurer has been
held absolutely relieved of all liability under the policy where the bene-
ficiary at the time of obtaining the policy of insurance intended to mur-
"' An example of a state statute authorizing injunction against solicitation in
this field is N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-38 (1950). This statute is discussed in 25 N. C.
L. REv. 379 (1947).
'" Winters, Interstate Commerce in Damage Suits, 29 Joun. Am. JUD. Soc. 135,
144 (1946).
8 Ibid. Labor generally regards the maximum benefits obtainable under existing
state acts as far too small.
'' Due to the fact that Congress cannot make procedural rules for the courts
which it does not create, it is generally conceded that Congress may not make the
forum non conveniens doctrine available as a procedural rule in state courts. This
seems to be borne out by the fact that Congress, in enacting section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code (28 U. S. C.), made no attempt to apply that section to state courts
in which actions under the FELA might be brought.
" For an example, see Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278,
226 N. W. 297 (1929).
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der the insured, or where the policy contained a clause specifically
making the contract void upon the happening of such an occurence. 1
While there is abundant authority to support the foregoing principles,
the recent case of Bullock v. Expressmeiv's Mitt. Life Ins. Coo" presented
the North Carolina Supreme Court with a somewhat similar fact situa-
tion on which there is scant authority.3 The deceased insured had pro-
cured a life insurance policy naming his wife as primary beneficiary and
a foster son as contingent beneficiary. 4 Insured was killed by his wife
who was convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to five years imprison-
ment, and was thereby disqualified from taking either as primary bene-
ficiary under the policy5 or from the deceased's personal estate.0  The
court, applying a strict construction to the insurance contract, held that
the contingent provision necessary to qualify the foster son to take as
beneficiary had not been fulfilled as the primary beneficiary had not
predeceased the insured; therefore, the administrator of the insured's
estate was allowed to recover.
The precise issue raised in the instant case was presented to an Ohio
lower court in Neff v. Massachusetts Mitt. Life Ins. Co.7 and a con-
trary result was reached. That court allowed the contingent beneficiary
to recover, holding that when the contract of insurance named secondary
or contingent beneficiaries, the insured had clearly indicated how the
proceeds of the policy were to be paid; therefore, the contingent provi-
sions of the contract should be carried out. It was noted that in those
cases where the estate of the insured had been awarded the proceeds of
'APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrIcE §§381-385 (1941); 6 COOLEY'S
BRiEFs ON INSURANCE 5227 (2d ed. 1927); RiCHrARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE §335
(4th ed., Long, 1932) ; VANCE, INSURANCE §117 (3d ed., Anderson, 1951) ; Gross-
man, Liability and Rights of the Inmurer When the Death of the Insured Is Caused
by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee, 10 B. U. L. R.v. 281 (1930) ; Notes, 7
A. L. R. 828 (1920), 27 A. L. R. 1521 (1923), 70 A. L. RM 1539 (1931), 91 A. L. R.
1488 (1934) ; 29 Am. JUR. §1310 (1940) ; 46 C. J. S. §1171 (1946).
2234 N. C. 254, 67 S. E. 2d 71 (1951).
3 The writer found three cases with comparable fact situations. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E. D. Mich. 1941) (group insurance
policy wherein the order of contingent beneficiaries was set forth) ; Welch v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (insured's estate named
as contingent beneficiary) ; Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 228 P. 2d 832 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (beneficiary sentenced to life imprisonment which, under
California statute, is treated as civil death and has the same legal effect as physical
death). However, only one case was discovered which was on "all fours" with
the principal case. Neff v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 96 N. E. 2d 53 (Ohio
C. P. 1951). None of these cases was decided by a court of final jurisdiction.
"Beneficiary provision was ". . . to [M], wife of the insured if living or if
not living to [R], son of the insured ... . Transcript of Record, p. 8, Bullock
v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 67 S. E. 2d 71 (1951).
"Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 152 N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53 (1910).
' Garner v. Phillips, 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845 (1948) ; Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§28-10, 30-4, 52-19 (1950).
'96 N. E. 2d 53 (Ohio C. P. 1951) The court stated the issue to be ... when
an insured has been murdered by the primary beneficiary, should the proceeds of
the life insurance policy be paid to the insured's estate or to the persons named in
the insurance policy as contingent or secondary beneficiaries?"
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
an insurance policy, there had been a complete failure of beneficiaries.
Thus the court appears to have reached an equitable result effectuating
the intent of the insured without changing the terms of the contract.8
The North Carolina court's construction of the contract may well
be questioned. It has been said that the intention of the parties is the
"polar star" of construction of an insurance contract, 9 and that it is a
practical rather than a literal or technical construction which is deemed
desirable. 10 The intention of the insured is the controlling element,1"
and a provision for disposition of the proceeds on the insured's death
must be construed as the insured intended.12  The mere fact that the
insured named a contingent beneficiary seems clearly to express his in-
tention as to whom should be the recipient of the policy proceeds in lieu
of the primary beneficiary. Had the primary beneficiary predeceased
the insured, undoubtedly the contingent beneficiary would have taken
under the policy. What, then, is the distinction between disqualifica-
tion by death and disqualification by law? Permitting recovery by the
contingent beneficiary in the Bullock case would seem to have been both
a reasonable and logical interpretation of the contract without reading
anything into it.
A line of argument, not advanced to the court in the Bullock case,
would allow the contingent beneficiary to recover under the precise
terms of the insurance contract. On the death of the insured, the pri-
mary beneficiary's rights become vested and he holds the legal claim to
the proceeds of the policy.' 3 However, on well established principles
of public policy, the beneficiary may not receive and enjoy the benefits
of this claim. 14 Therefore, a constructive trust could be imposed upon.
this interest in the hands of the primary beneficiary.' 5 Once this con-
structive trust is established, the next step to be taken is the 'determina-
tion of the beneficiary of this trust. It would seem that such a deter-
mination should be based upon the intention of the insured, if ascertain-
able. Where the insured has clearly expressed his intent by naming a
contingent beneficiary, even though the contingency has not occurred,
the court should recognize this intention by designating the contingent
'The North Carolina court stated that to reach such a result would be chang-
ing the terms of the contract which it had no power to do. Bullock v. Express-
men's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 258, 67 S. E. 2d 71, 74 (1951).
'13 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE §7385 (1940).
10 13 id. §7386. 1 2 id. §781. 1 13 id. §7424. 13 2 id. §921.
1 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (1886) ; Anderson v. Life
Ins. Co. of Virginia, 152 N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53 (1910); VANCE INSURANCE §117
(3d ed., Anderson, 1951).
"0 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §189 (1937); 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS §494.1 (1939).
Although the North Carolina court did not infer that it was using the construc-
tive trust theory in the Bullock case, note 2 supra, or in the Anderson case, supra
note 14, it has employed that device to prevent a murderer from acquiring property
by his own wrongful act. Garner v. Phillips, 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845
(1948) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 232 (1948).
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beneficiary as the recipient of the trust.16 In reaching such a result,
the court would have (1) carried out the express terms of the contract,
(2) applied the constructive trust theory to prevent a party from
profiting by his own wrongdoing, and (3) reached an equitable result
effectuating the intent of the insured.
While some jurisdictions have passed statutes allowing the contingent
beneficiary to receive the proceeds of the policy in such a situation, 17
other jurisdictions have reached the same result' 8 without statutory aid
and with the approval of those writers 19 who have commented on the
subject. A similar result has also been reached by courts confronted
"6It should be noted that both the RESTATEMENT and Scorr, id., state that the
beneficiary holds his interest under the policy upon a constructive trust for the
estate of the insured. Apparently, however, this result is meant to apply only
when there is no contingent beneficiary named in the contract for it is Scott's
contention that in such a situation the contingent beneficiary should receive the
policy proceeds and not the estate of the insured.
" NED. REV. STAT. §30-120 (1943) : "No person who has been convicted of un-
lawfully killing another, or conspiring unlawfully to kill another, shall be entitled
to any insurance on the life of the deceased. If the person so convicted is the
beneficiary under any policy or policies of life insurance, or beneficial certificate
or certificates, such insurance shall go to the person or persons who would have
been entitled thereto if the person so convicted had been dead at the date of the
death of the deceased."
S. D. CODE §56.0510 (1939) : "Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the
beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance on the life of the
decedent, or as the survivor of a joint life policy, shall be paid to the estate of
the decedent, unless the policy or certificate designates some person not claiming
through the slayer as alternative beneficiary to him. .. ."
Other states have statutes directing that the insurance proceeds shall be dis-
bursed by the laws of descent and distribution:
IOWA CODE ANN. §636.49 (1950) : "In every instance mentioned in section ...
636.48 [that section bars a beneficiary, who has taken the life of the insured, from
receiving the policy proceeds], all benefits that would accrue to any such person
upon the death ... of the person whose life is thus taken ... shall become subject
to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased person, according to the
foregoing rules of descent and distribution in case of death .... "
Of like effect: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §231 (1938); ORE. CoBiP. LAWS ANN.
§16-203 (1940).
See McDade v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Ia. 857, 860, 195 N. W. 603,
604 (1923). The court in construing the Iowa statute stated that "The statute was
evidently meant to meet a situation where a policy of insurance is made payable
to a beneficiary who takes the life of the insured, and where there is no provision
whatever in the policy as to the disposition of the proceeds of the insurance."
"8 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E. D. Mich. 1941);
Welch v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Neff v. Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 96 N. E. 2d 53 (Ohio C. P. 1951) ; accord, Beck v.
West Coast Life Ins. Co., 228 P. 2d 832 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ; see, Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Weightman, 61 Okla. 106, 111, 160 Pac. 629, 634 (1916).
193 ScoTt, TRUSTS §494.1 (1939) : "If by the terms of the policy, or in the case
of a fraternal organization by the by-laws of the organization, an alternative bene-
ficiary is designated, and the principal beneficiary murders the insured, the alterna-
tive beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds of the policy." See Wade, Acquisition
of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L.
REv. 715, 742 (1936).
It is interesting to note that both authors and the Ohio court in the Neff case,
note 7 supra, cited Parker v. Potter, 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68 (1931), to sup-




with this problem when mutual benefit association certificates were in-
volved. 20 Concededly, these cases are distinguishable in that the asso-
ciation's charter or by-laws contained a provision for alternative or
contingent beneficiaries if the original designation failed; yet, any 'dis-
tinction appears unreal when an old line insurance policy contains a con-
tingent beneficiary provision.
As the precise issue presented by the Bullock case was one of first
impression before any court of final jurisdiction in the United States,21
it is regrettable that the decision reached was contrary to the existing
authority on the subject. Furthermore, as the result was patently con-
trary to the intention of the insured22 and will probably be binding on
the court under the doctrine of stare decisis, the following statutory
proposal is offered for consideration:
Where the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or certificate, or
the assignee of such policy or certificate, or the survivor of a
joint life policy or certificate, has feloniously taken, or procured to
be taken, the life of the insured, any proceeds payable under the
terms of such policy or certificate shall be paid to any alternative
or contingent beneficiary named in the policy or certificate who
does not claim through the slayer; provided, if no alternative or
contingent beneficiary is designated in the policy or certificate,
such proceeds shall be paid to the estate of the insured decedent. 23
DAVID L. STRAIN, JR.
Negligence-Automobiles-Joint Enterprise
In cases involving automobile accidents, North Carolina has recog-
nized and followed the joint enterprise doctrine since 1921.1 In a re-
cent 'decision, James v. Atlantic & E. C. R. R.,2 the court stated that
20 Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277, 70 N. E. 567 (1904) ; Schmidt
v. Northern Life Ass'n., 112 Ia. 41, 83 N. W. 800 (1900); Sharpless v. Grand
Lodge, 135 Minn. 35, 159 N. W. 1086 (1916).
21 See note 3 supra.
Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 258, 67 S. E. 2d
71, 74 (1951) (". . . in the case at bar it may be presumed in the light of subse-
quent happenings the insured would have wished his foster son to have the in-
surance money. .. ").
2 See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfidly Killing Another-A Statu-
tory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 741 (1936), for an extensive discussion of the
intent and purpose of such a statute.
1Pusey v.* Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 181 N. C. 137, 106 S. E. 452 (1921).
In the Pusey case the court seemingly states that the doctrine of joint enterprise
was adopted by North Carolina in Hunt v. Railroad, 170 N. C. 442, 87 S. E. 210
(1915), but the court in the Hunt case does not mention the doctrine. It merely
reiterates the rule that the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to a pas-
senger unless he is the owner of the car or controls the driver in some way.
2 233 N. C. 591, 65 S. E. 2d 214 (1951). Other N. C. cases dealing with the
doctrine are: Matheny v. Central Motor Lines, 233 N. C. 681, 65 S. E. 2d 368
(1951) ; Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N. C. 99, 63 S. E. 2d 190 (1951) ; Pike v. Seymour,
222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942) ; Harper v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 211
N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937); Exum v. Poole, 207 N. C. 244, 176 S. E. 556
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